





Thinking through anthropocentrism in international 
law: queer theory, feminist new materialism and the 
postcolonial 
 
A conversation between Emily Jones (University of Essex)  
and Dianne Otto (University of Melbourne)  
 
In this conversation, we briefly outline the long-standing feminist critiques of liberal 
humanism in international law, as a starting point for our discussion about what a 
feminist approach to valuing and defending nature might be from a posthuman 
feminist or feminist new materialist perspective. We then consider how a posthuman 
feminist approach relates to the idea of granting legal personality to nature – or at 
least some aspects of nature - and the promises and risks of such projects. In 
conclusion we note the limits of the law for feminists and others seeking to centre or 
protect nature while also challenging the hierarchies liberal humanism and the 
anthropocene create, and suggest some alternative ways of thinking about the 
relationship between nature and international law from a feminist perspective. 
 
Emily: Di, feminists have long been critical of the figure of the ‘human’ that is privileged 
by liberalism and reflected in international law. Could you start us off by summarising 
these critiques? 
 
Di: While these critiques will be familiar to everyone at this workshop, it is important 
to give them a central place in our conversation because, in thinking about threats to 
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nature, we are not suggesting we abandon the feminist projects already underway in 
international law – in fact, they are fundamentally interrelated. 
 
To date, feminists have exposed the particularity of the characteristics of the 
supposedly universal human being as constituted by international human rights law 
and the exclusionary effects that follow from this juridical creation. We have exposed 
the gendered, raced, imperial, heteronormative, privileged, autonomous and ableist 
assumptions implicit in this ‘universal’ subject – the human who is able to fully enjoy 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.  
 
As a result, liberal/humanist international law relies upon and normalises a multitude 
of intra-human hierarchies – which work together to advantage the autonomous, 
white, able-bodied, middle class, heterosexual Man and marginalise all those who do 
not fit within this privileged category – rendering them not fully human – or ‘exiled’ 
within the law, as I have described it on an earlier occasion.1 Further, feminists have 
shown how these human hierarchies work analytically to underpin and shape 
international law’s structures, commitments and rationalities more generally – 
including its conceptions of the ‘normal’ nation state, of sovereignty and self-
determination, of the international neo-liberal economic system and, linked with all 
this, laws relating to armed conflict – and ‘peace’. Problematically, for all of us, 
promoting and engaging in armed conflict is in many respects understood as the 
supreme expression of robust masculinity – as a sign of strength; and advocating for 
‘peace’ is understood as its feminine converse - a sign of weakness. In a similar way, 
‘nature’ has been feminised and treated as the object of Man’s rationality and scientific 
knowledges. 
 
But Emily, posthuman feminists mount a much more extensive critique of liberal 
humanism – would you outline their perspective(s)? 
 
Emily: Posthuman feminism is made up of many different branches. The form of 
posthuman feminism I am interested in lies at the convergence between post-
humanism and post-anthropocentrism.2 Post-humanism critiques the concept of 
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humanity, noting how “humanity” has never included all humans, being based upon 
the supposedly universal Man. Post-anthropocentrism, however, critiques the idea 
that the Man is the central figure who is justified in dominating nature. Posthuman 
feminism brings these two critiques together, highlighting the ways in which a 
particular human subject has come to be centred in western thinking. This includes 
centring the white, male, heterosexual, able-bodied, middle class Man of liberal 
thought - described above by Di and the object of sustained feminist critique - as well 
as privileging the human over other subjects including nature and nonhuman animals. 
Feminist new materialism is part of this feminist posthuman convergence, working to 
dismantle the hierarchy of the human over nature. Feminist new materialists question 
the subject/object binary as found within Descartes’s separation and hierarchisation 
of mind over body/matter, arguing instead that matter matters.3 Feminist new 
materialism thus centres matter, including nature, as an actor. Nature, like all matter, 
is not fixed but changes, and is alive and adapts. Nature is self-organising and not 
shaped by human intervention alone but rather, humans and nature-matter change and 
respond to one another.  
 
Di: Do you think posthuman feminism has the potential to address the concerns raised 
by older feminist critiques, or does it push them aside with the idea of the 
Anthropocene, which, as you say, rests on another deeply problematic hierarchical 
duality whereby humans, as a universal block or force, are privileged over the non-
human? 
 
Emily: I see feminist posthumanism and its engagement with international law not as 
something entirely new but, rather, as a continuation of earlier feminist work. As we 
have noted, feminist legal theory has long worked to dismantle the hierarchies of 
liberal humanism and feminist posthumanism seeks to continue that project while 
also applying that project to the anthropocene (broadly defined as the present 
geological era in which human activity has become the dominant influence on the 
environment). In addition, however, I think bringing feminist theory to the debates on 
climate change and the anthropocene is key to ensuring that the hierarchies which 
exist between humans are not lost when seeking to break down the human-nature 
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hierarchy. The different ways in which differently situated people are and will be 
impacted by climate change cannot be forgotten, in terms of gender and class as well 
as race.4 Similarly, human beings have differentiated responsibilities for climate 
change and unequal power to take action to mitigate or halt it. Anthropocentrism, 
colonialism and capitalism have always been deeply entwined, including in 
international law, creating and reproducing global inequalities that enable privileged 
humans to exploit less privileged people, their environments and their natural 
resources, and produce the fossil and mineral economy and its uneven distribution of 
wealth. 
 
Di: So, climate change might be understood as ‘a crisis of human hierarchy’ as Anna 
Grear suggests,5 which directly links earlier feminist concerns with addressing climate 
change and other human-caused threats to nature? One way a posthuman feminist 
might seek to de-centre the human in international law, and disrupt the associated 
hierarchies, may be to grant nature international legal personality so that it, or its 
various components, become legal ‘persons’ - and thereby have the power to make 
legal claims to protection, to restitution, to equality and non-discrimination, like 
humans. Can you explain what this might look like? 
 
Emily: There have been various recent moves globally to grant domestic legal 
personality to nature, the most recent example being the proposed Right of Nature Bill 
in the Philippines.6 Many of these moves have focused on bodies of water, with Ohio 
in the US recently giving legal personhood to Lake Erie7, and the Indian Supreme Court 
in 2017 affirming a judgement by the High Court of Uttarakhand8 which gave legal 





One of the most widely publicised examples, however, was the granting of legal 
personality to the Whanganui River in New Zealand under the Whanganui River Claims 
Settlement Act of 2017.9 The agreement followed a long struggle by local Māori 
activists, the Whanganui iwi, who contested the legal model of ownership and 
management that had been applied to the river prior to the Act. They argued that they 
are situated in connection with the environment they live in and thus that the river is 
alive, an ancestor. The river, now, is one and part of the tribe at law, meaning that 
harming the river is, by law, harming the tribe, respecting the connection between the 
health and wellbeing of the river and the health and wellbeing of the people and 
therefore ascribing the river with the rights and duties of a legal person. 
 
This statutory recognition of the river seems like one way in which nature’s agency 
and need for protection could be recognised, while also working to promote Māori 
rights and thus also challenge the hierarchy between indigenous and non-indigenous 
New Zealander forms of knowledge and law.  
 
Di: Would granting legal personality to nature necessarily be a progressive move? 
There are a couple of ways that it could go terribly awry. First, isn’t granting rights to 
nature double-edged - like the granting of marriage rights to same-sex couples which 
recognises same-sex intimate partnerships (gives them legal personality and grants 
rights) but only so long as they comply with mainstream heterosexual norms and 
practises. So the quid pro quo for granting nature certain rights may well be that the 
exercise of those rights is only possible when consistent with the liberal-capitalist-
humanist status quo when, for example, it does not cost jobs or suspend or extinguish 
private property rights. 
 
A second possibility is that nature could acquire a juridical personality like that of a 
corporation – which, especially in its transnational form, has been described as the 
‘apotheosis’ – or perfected form - of the disembodied, rational, autonomous, white, 
male, property-owning anthropos constituted by the law.10 The transnational 
corporation enjoys legal personality and unparalleled associated rights that limit its 
accountability/liability and protect elite interests above all other considerations. It is 
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conceivable that the juridical reconstitution of nature as agential would similarly be in 
the image of the privileged human. 
 
Either way, isn’t the strategy of granting rights to nature risking its incorporation into 




Emily: I completely agree: neo/liberal legalism is the limit of the legal personality for 
nature model. The problem with the neo/liberal legal frame which underpins much of 
the dominant global lawscape is its ability to mould everything, including projects of 
potential resistance, into its frame of the law. Same-sex marriage is a core example of 
this – how queer radicality11 ends up creating liberal legal recognition only for some. 
For example, one of the things I found promising about the Whanganui River Claims 
Settlement Act was its potential to disrupt dominant frames of property. Property and 
the conceptualisation of nature as property or as an object has played a key role in 
environmental domination and exploitation in the name of profit. Seeing the river as a 
subject, however, challenges the subject/object binary which underpins this system of 
domination. However, while under the Act the people and the river are declared to be 
one, the Act explicitly states that it does not derogate from existing private rights in 
the Whanganui River. The Act, therefore, while being key for Māori rights, is carefully 
constructed to ensure that it is framed so as not to disrupt the neo/liberal legal order 
too much: allowing for recognition within the frames of neo/liberal law alone and thus 
allowing the liberal legal project to claim its progressive credentials while ensuring 




But all of this is part of a wider problem for feminists and other critical thinkers of 
being caught between resistance and compliance12: using the law for change while 
also knowing that there is a need to think beyond the law as the law holds limited 
promise for radical change. This is a core tension that Ratna Kapur also grapples with 
in her latest book.13 Kapur argues for the need to stop holding on to human rights as 
an emancipatory project, highlighting how human rights law is used to uphold 
patriarchy, colonialism and capitalism. Thus, while rights can be a useful tool for the 
recognition of some, it is also a governance project which includes some and excludes 
others (as in same-sex marriage). The same argument can be applied to the granting 
of rights to nature – that recognition comes at a cost. 
 
Kapur searches for alternative understandings of freedom found in epistemologies of 
the non-liberal Global South. However, while Kapur notes the inherent problems of the 
law and the law as a violent governance structure, she also highlights that the law can 
still be useful, calling not for abandonment of the human rights law but that it be 
understood for what it is; a mechanism of governance as opposed to a freedom 
project. Following this way of thinking, while the granting of legal personality to nature 
clearly has its limits, such a move could be understood as an incremental step towards 
greater change. Of course, there remains a core tension here in that using the law will 
only ever provide limited change and that using the law itself works to legitimate the 
law: balancing between resistance and compliance requires a nuanced understanding 
of all the issues and there is no one clear strategy for those seeking more radical 
change. 
 
At same time, the Whanganui River Settlement Act provides some further recognition 
of Māori rights and it is important to note that this Act was negotiated and signed by 
the Whanganui iwi. I guess the question left by all of this is where do we, as critical 
feminists in international law, look for hope? 
 
Di: Like the New Zealand legislature, others are turning to indigenous laws for 
guidance, which offer alternative ways of thinking about the relationship between 
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nature and law. Here’s how Christine Black describes Aboriginal law in The Land is the 
Source of the Law: 
 
[In Australia] law that is posited in the ‘rights’ of the Land has been moved to 
law that is posited in the ‘rights’ of humans… [Aboriginal law] is a system of 
relationship … to each other, to species, to land … when we are in relationship … 
everyone gives and receives in a structured relationship which comes from the 
land … Indigenous law must be given equal standing with Australian common 
law .. [this will] not only address the problem of pollution [and climate change] 
but will go to the core of the racial divide in Australia.14 
 
I read this to suggest exactly what we have been talking about – that challenging the 
human/nature hierarchy also challenges the hierarchies that systematically structure 
human (dis)advantage, such as racism.  
 
What then does this suggest about posthuman feminist strategies in international 
law? 
 
My first impulse is to look for existing norms in international law that could lend weight 
to a much more fundamental feminist rethinking of international law than granting 
rights to nature. Three principles emerge for me from Black’s work. 
 
First, she describes a law that values relationships and collectivism over individual 
enrichment and competitiveness. This is perhaps suggested by article 28 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948: “Everyone is entitled to a social 
and economic order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can 
be fully realised.” 
 
Currently, our human inter-relationships are primarily regulated by states. To also 
recognise nature’s agency and its entanglements with humans we need to rethink our 
understanding of the nation-state, in order to include the natural environment in its 
9 
 
definition (as distinct from ‘territory’) and the responsibilities that flow from its 
inclusion on a par with its ‘permanent population’ (Montevideo Convention). 
 
Further, connected to the idea of a planetary order in which everyone is equally able to 
exercise their human rights and fundamental freedoms are state’s obligations to 
engage in ‘international cooperation and assistance’ (UN Charter and ICESCR), the 
principle of the common heritage of humankind, and the commitment to sustainable 
development, amongst others. These doctrines provide footholds for the kind of 
inclusive, respectful and redistributive politics that could produce an international law 
that dismantles the hierarchies amongst humans and between human and non-human 
ways of knowing and being. 
 
Second, Black describes a law which places at least as much emphasis (probably 
more) on responsibilities as on individual or even group rights. In international law, 
responsibilities have received much less emphasis than rights – they are seen as 
arising from rights rather than as important on their own terms – their purpose is to 
secure rights rather than connect us in a structured way. The UDHR does make 
reference to responsibilities in article 29, although in deeply humanist terms: 
 
(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development of his [sic] personality is possible. 
(2) In the exercise of his [sic] rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject 
only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of 
securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and 
of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general 
welfare in a democratic society. 
 
There is clearly lots of work to do to broaden the interpretation of existing international 
law to include responsibilities that arise from our interactions with the natural/non-
human world. A start, perhaps, has been made with more expansive interpretations of 
the right to life and the right to an adequate standard of living, but this remains limited 





A third commitment, implicit in Black’s work, is that we need law that is not founded 
upon violence and does not rely on violence for its enforcement. At a minimum, this 
places demilitarisation and general disarmament, as well as human equality, at the 
centre of our responsibilities to nature, as well as to each other, commitments that 
have always been central to feminist agendas.  
 
Therefore, an already crucial question for feminists in international law now assumes 
even more urgency: how can we promote an international law, including an 
international law of peace, that is not founded on hierarchy and violence – violence 
directed against both humans and non-humans, including nature? Posthuman 















1 Dianne Otto, “The exile of inclusion: reflections on gender issues in international law over the last 
decade”, 10. Melbourne Journal of International Law (2009).  
2 Rosi Braidotti, Posthuman Knowledge. Cambridge: Polity Press (2019).  
3 Karen Barad, “Posthumanist performativity: toward an understanding of how matter comes to 
matter”, 28 (3), Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society (2003). 
4 See https://unfccc.int/gender and 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24735&LangID=E for 
example 
5 Anna Grear, “Deconstructing Anthropos: a critical legal reflection on ‘anthropocentric’ law and 





8 Salim V. State of Uttarakhand, Writ Petition (PIL) No. 126 of 2014 (December 5, 2016 and March 20, 
2017) High Court of Uttarakhand at https://www.elaw.org/salim-v-state-uttarakhand-writ-petition-pil-
no126-2014-december-5-2016-and-march-20-2017  
9 Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 at 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2017/0007/latest/whole.html  
10 Grear, “Deconstructing Anthropos”. 
11 Dianne Otto (ed.), Queering international law. Abingdon: Routledge (2018). 
12 Sari Kouvo and Zoe Pearson (eds.), Feminist perspectives on contemporary international law: 
between resistance and compliance?, Portland: Hart Publishing (2011).  
13 Ratna Kapur, Gender, alterity and human rights: freedom in a fishbowl. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing (2018). 










This work was initially presented at the 
Workshop on Gender, Nature and Peace, Centre 
for Women, Peace and Security, LSE, 17 June 
2019, funded by the British Academy small grant 
and by the AHRC project a Feminist International 
Law of Peace and Security.  
 
